Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
Introduction
"The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered." 1 Over 230 years ago Edmund Burke warned his superpower nation of the limits of military power, alone, to defeat an insurgency seeking to create a radical new government. Today the United States is learning the limit of its military power in Iraq. After easily defeating the state of Iraq, the unstable aftermath provides a thriving environment for a range of unconventional, sub-national threats (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, violent religious fundamentalists and armed criminal gangs) presenting a significant and growing challenges to US interests. Sub-national actors thrive in unstable environments where the lack of healthy nation-state ordering principles (e.g., functioning state legal, economic and political systems) allow them to pursue their goals without significant opposition. Their goals and the actions taken to achieve them threaten US national interests.
Combating sub-national threats requires the integrated employment of all instruments of US national power. In particular, broader employment of economic power by military forces during security and stability operations will significantly increase hope within conflicted societies. Fulfilling expectations for better, more prosperous lives promotes social, political and economic order and undermines the appeal of alternative systems promoted by US opponents. Economic condition is a critical vulnerability that can be targeted by the United States to attack local popular support for sub-national actors, a key center of gravity (CoG) for these opponents. Improving local economies
Economics and Fourth Generation Warfare
The United States' military power, pre-eminent on the conventional battlefield, falls woefully short confronting social, political and economic conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife underlying insurgencies. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), allows non-state groups and individuals to pursue interests outside of the state structure leading to a rise in low-intensity conflict. 3 The current National Security Strategy identifies a portion of this threat as terrorism, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents." 4 However terrorism as defined by the NSS does not cover the expanding range of sub-national actors from criminal gangs and drug cartels to political insurgents and religious extremists fighting for a myriad of social and cultural values rather than the interests or policies of a nation-state. 5 Lind originally coined the term, "fourth generation warfare" to describe conflict between sovereign states and sub-national opponents comprised of individuals and groups whose primary loyalty lay with other than a traditional nation-state. 6 These adversaries operate in and draw much of their strength from chaotic environments, such as found currently in Iraq.
Operating outside of the Clausewitzian trinity of the state, the people and the army, trinitarian warfighting strategies, such as US conventional warfare doctrine, are ineffective, by themselves, against fourth generation opponents. 7 Alternative strategies to conventional military force must be developed to attack fourth generation opponents. The United States' National Security Strategy charts two courses of action, pre-emption and engagement. 8 Employed in balance, these strategies offer synergies to destroy fourth generation opponents while resolving the conditions fostering them. Employed out of synch or individually, they squander US power while strengthening fourth generation adversaries. As experienced in Iraq, much of the United
States' high tech weaponry is ineffective against insurgents that blend in with the local populace. Moreover, persistent use of heavy combat power with its attendant destruction and civilian casualties undermines support for the US effort at home and abroad and increases support for the insurgents from among the local population. 9 Repeated use of military force, alone, against individuals and small groups empowers fourth generation adversaries by expanding the range of their violent response without compromising their political or moral support. 10 Similarly, employing US diplomatic, informational and economic soft power cannot work without military power; without security the elements of soft power such as diplomats, contractors and NGOs are easily attacked by fourth generation adversaries. Alternatively, Lind suggests quick, targeted, military strikes against hardcore insurgent elements combined with broad efforts to deescalate tension with the local population from which they draw support. 11 This suggests employing a broad soft power program to create the conditions for a better state of peace while maintaining low-key security. The US Marine Corp describes these operations as fighting a "three block war" where US forces prepare for major combat, armed security and peacekeeping all within a few city blocks. 12 While attempting this approach in Iraq, the United States employs its elements of power in a haphazard fashion, especially economic power.
Recent attempts to employ economic power in concert with military power in Iraq achieved some successes but also faced extensive challenges. The results point to opportunities to improve the coordination and employment of military and economic elements of national power in fourth generation warfare. One result, Congressional consideration of a federal government-wide "Goldwater-Nichols Act" to increase interagency planning and resources for conflict stabilization and rehabilitation operations recognizes the United States must employ more than just military power to attack the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.
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However, without security other government agencies (e.g., USAID), non-government organizations (e.g., International Red Cross) and international organizations (e.g., United Nations) cannot operate on a broad scale to significantly alter the environment supporting fourth generation adversaries. As a result, when conducting military operations, the US military must plan, organize, and lead the employment of all of the instruments of power. Conversely, achieving a security environment supporting large-scale employment of US soft power presents a dilemma as conventional military operations alone are not sufficient to achieve a stable environment.
Recent successes by US battlefield commanders in Iraq to achieve and maintain stability using elements of economic power in coordination with military operations raises the third possibility of coordinated, large scale employment of economic power by US forces in future conflicts to set conditions for transition to civil control. Separating fourth generation opponents from their local support base presents greater opportunities to focus military power on destroying the hardcore, unconvertible enemy.
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The operational success of initial CERP projects caused the program to rapidly expand.
Expansion quickly consumed available seized Iraqi funds, stalling the program until Congress provided emergency appropriated funds for its continuance.
As the CERP stands today, it suffers from deficiencies in the amount and regularity of funding and a lack of appreciation for its deescalating effect among commanders new to stabilization operations. Congress needs to recognize CERP's effectiveness as an element of power for commanders by appropriating sufficient funds for wider application and authorizing an annual CERP budget. Congress first appropriated $180 million in CERP funds in the FY04 emergency supplemental bill passed to finance on-going operations in Iraq. 12 DoD requested an additional $320 million for CERP in Iraq in its FY05 emergency supplemental request currently before congress. 13 Rather than treat CERP as an emergency funding action, DoD should establish an annual program including CERP in its yearly budget submission. For its part, Congress must include CERP in the annual DoD appropriations law with appropriate guidance to ensure commanders have a ready and on-going capability to employ economic power in future operations. Experience in Iraq showed that instability increased when CERP projects lapsed due to lack of funds. One Army AAR noted:
The battalion had spent considerable time building trust and faith with the local interim government. This had been constructed with many face-toface meetings and prioritization of projects to be completed. Much of this "good faith" was destroyed when the CERP funds were no longer available to the battalion commander.
14 A regular CERP appropriation, like standard O&M funding, will also build commanders' familiarity by regular employment in contingencies and field exercises. As one Army review recognized:
The apparent lack of a unified rebuilding plan is as much a result of the military planning priorities as the lack of CPA direction. In preparation to deploy, maneuver units admittedly did not focus on CMO. The focus was on the war fight as opposed to Phase IV-type operations. The CERP first employed in Iraq during OIF and later in Afghanistan provides a unique tool to commanders by allowing US combat forces to employ an element of United States' economic power directly against enemy forces. Two key provisions of the appropriation created the utility and flexibility critical for the CERP successes. First, the law specifically identified the CERP as a commander's program for use in the deployed AOR thereby preventing the services from tying up the funds in a bureaucratic maze that would delay and frustrate their employment. However, the purpose of the appropriated funds for, "emergency response" raised questions regarding the latitude Congress's intended to give operational commanders, especially as significant funds outside of CERP were appropriated for security and reconstruction efforts that duplicated commander's efforts. 24 Future Congressional appropriations must recognize the fundamental purpose of the CERP, to win the hearts and minds of local populations as a means to combat insurgencies. Any codification of law governing CERP employment must preserve commanders' latitude to employ funds as necessary to achieve this end.
The second key provision, inclusion of the simple phrase in the legislation, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," unburdened the funding from all of the restrictions normally associated with federal appropriations. 25 This language lifted both fiscal law's, "purpose" restriction that limited commanders range of employment of CERP funds, as well as restrictions of the federal procurement system for putting funds on contract. For instance the appropriation exempted CERP projects from the requirement to obtain competitive proposals for government contracts reducing the time to establish a project and freeing commanders to best target the funds in the local economy to achieve mission objectives. On any given day there was in excess of $100K in cash for local contracts that needed management. The battalion had no dedicated personnel to handle the task but recognized that contracted development work was critical for support and stability operations.
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Personnel detailed to manage CERP lacked training. The Army CAAT recognized the lack of trained personnel undermined CERP effectiveness:
Commanders lacked the skilled personnel to professionally define the projects they were asked to do. These projects originated locally from neighborhood action councils (NACs). Personnel on these councils had high expectations as to the quality of work and materials incorporated into the completed project. Their expectations were rarely met. Adherence to federal, DoD, and service procurement laws and regulations is a primary responsibility of a warranted contracting officer. Failure to follow these rules can result in criminal and administrative consequences for the contracting officer.
Conflicting mission priorities that regularly arise in peacetime become amplified on the battlefield. One case reported by the Army CAAT involved a battalion commander's request to expedite a contract for up-armoring his High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The commander recommended a sole source contract to a qualified vendor based on the need to quickly provide additional protection for his soldiers.
Instead the contracting officer insisted on soliciting multiple offers for the work adding 30 days to the process. Ultimately, after competition, the contract was awarded to a successful offeror, the same sole source vendor originally recommended by the battalion commander. 43 To the extent the contracting officer understood the commander's request, legal requirements for competitive procurement trumped the commander's judgment on force protection in a combat environment. Utilizing personnel from operational combat units to implement and manage CERP was neither an effective use of combat power nor an efficient use of economic power.
Instead, sufficient, specialized personnel supporting battlefield commanders' intent for employing economic power should compliment the combat power of operational forces.
In this manner commanders' can effectively employ Lind's strategy of co-opting or killing fourth generation adversaries. 45 Specially-trained support personnel under the command and control of operational commanders possess both the skills and unity of purpose to effectively implement CERP on a sufficient scale to achieve broad and lasting effects. Trained combat forces are thereby freed to perform their primary function and provide the secure environment necessary for a successful stability operation. Moreover, combat service support personnel authorized and trained to support CERP provide a stronger system of funds accountability for commanders. Establishing a system to demonstrate consistent, effective use of CERP funds will insulate the program from Additionally, the experience with CERP demonstrates effective use of economic power requires trained procurement personnel from logisticians developing CMO requirements to contracting officers establishing HCA projects and engineers that oversee their completion. Organizing these functions to achieve battlefield effects requires new doctrine and changes to existing procurement laws and regulations. The acquisition system must change its focus to weigh effects and operational outcomes supporting battlefield commanders rather than the business-oriented performance measures driving procurement decisions today.
Joint Doctrine for Employing Economic Power
Military doctrine presents fundamental principles for employing forces based on historical experience as well as recent lessons for the purpose of leveraging US strengths against enemy weaknesses. 3 The US military continues to employ economic power in Iraq to improve the social and economic conditions of the Iraqi populace as a foundation for renewed social and political order. Increased socio-political order is a critical vulnerability of fourth generation opponents that otherwise thrive in chaotic environments. Positive and negative lessons learned from the CERP in Iraq must be included in doctrine for the benefit of future commanders. Updated military doctrine must also discuss economic power in terms familiar to battlefield commanders.
In light of CERP successes, problems existed with unity of effort and a lack of doctrine guiding commanders' implementation of the program at the unit level. Initiative and responsibility for CERP projects properly devolved to local commanders who could identify and implement local projects positively affecting ordinary Iraqi's in their AOR.
Above the brigade level neither CJTF7, nor the CPA possessed the resources to coordinate CERP activities. Within CJTF7, the lack of a theater CMO plan meant there was no horizontal and vertical integration of CERP projects within the AOR resulting in squandered resources and degraded effectiveness of the overall program to support the strategic end state of stability operations. 4 In contrast, initiative and innovation within individual operational units provide positive lessons learned. One division employed its existing staff structure in a new way to provide unity of effort for its CMO activities including the CERP:
A structure to manage civil reconstruction projects within any size task force is necessary to ensure a unity of effort and optimal impact on the overall CMO plan. One such TTP is to use non-lethal effects matrices in the form of an effects coordination cell (ECC) to track individual projects and available funding. Both at the division and brigade levels, the ECC is headed by the fire support officer (FSO), due to the existing staff of the fire support section coupled with the fact that indirect fires are not being heavily utilized currently in Iraq. This additionally capitalizes on the established relations between division and brigade FSOs. The ECC allows for an organized, targeted, equitable distribution of CERP funding in the division AO. Third, joint doctrine on CMO must expand to include economic elements such as the CERP addressing its direct contribution to military objectives. As written, CMO is purely a support function for either military or civil operations.
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When the 101st
Airborne Division Commander, MG Petraeus equated CERP funds to ammunition he clearly referred to a critical main effort. 12 CERP exists due to the recognition of the real effects of economic power but its haphazard employment demonstrates the lack of consistent thought regarding the method and processes for employing that power.
Lastly joint doctrine should address unity of effort of both the field commanders executing a CERP and combat service support elements supporting the commander. A fundamental concept of joint warfare is unity of effort ensuring all efforts focus on common aims. 13 A combatant commander achieves unity of effort through the unified actions of subordinate forces, executing a common plan. 14 Speed is also a critical component for the success of individual CERP projects to rapidly target an effect supporting the commander's operational intent, developing a CERP project to achieve the effect and realizing it through implementation. A responsive procurement system is the cornerstone of successful CERP projects. In the first 9 months of the program commanders directed the expenditure of over $126 million in CERP funds on CMO projects to stabilize Iraqi society and rebuild the country's economy.
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Commanders complained the lack of support for developing and executing CERP projects quickly degraded their ability to achieve the effect of winning the hearts and minds of local Iraqis and undermining support for the insurgents. 21 ,
22
The CPA and CJTF7 commander directed CERP utilize procurement rules derived from DoD's current acquisition process. 23 Utilizing DoD's acquisition processes optimized for peacetime procurement degraded CERP effectiveness as much as the lack of a support infrastructure for the program.
The current federal procurement system lacks the flexibility to consider cost efficiency and effectiveness in terms of achieving battlefield effects or cost tradeoffs in terms of US lives and material to achieve mission success. Instead the procurement system is optimized to ensure best value for the tax payers' dollars within a competitive,
western-style open market. While federal law contains exceptions for urgency allowing acceleration of the procurement process, neither the design nor the organization of the system is optimal for supporting combat operations. 24 Regarding process, Congress must modify existing procurement laws that focus almost exclusively on peacetime business considerations to achieve fair and reasonable prices for goods and services obtained with appropriated funds. Instead, during combat operations, achieving effects best supporting the commander's intent and minimizing risk to US forces should drive the expenditure of appropriated funds. Regarding organization, procurement authority, unique to government contracting officers, is separate from command authority; the procurement authority chain flows from the services to deployed contracting officers, bypassing the combatant commander. 25 Service procurement rules guide deployed contracting officers' actions and strongly influence the speed of procurement support for combat operations.
In the example of the contracting officer delaying up-armoring of HMMWVs, service motivations inadvertently put US forces at risk. B.H. Liddell Hart said, "The object of war is a better set of peace…it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." 3 Joint doctrine echoes Hart telling commanders a key element of campaign design is understanding the desired end state. 4 Distinct differences exist between conflict termination, the formal end of fighting, and conflict resolution, addressing the underlying causes of the conflict that lead to a better state of peace. 5 If possible, military operations on the battlefield to achieve conflict termination should also support the broader goal of conflict resolution. In Iraq, US Strategists studying fourth generation warfare recognize developing the economic infrastructure lays the foundation for social and political stability alleviating the conditions supporting fourth generation opponents. 8 In Iraq US forces employed economic elements of power to achieve real, positive effects against unconventional opponents. Significant changes are still needed to further develop this capability and maintain a consistent strategy integrating economic and military power capable of defeating fourth generation opponents.
